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SYSTEMIC DEVELOPMENT AT HAWKESBURY:  SOME PERSONAL 
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 
 
Richard Bawden1* 
1 College of Agriculture and Natural Resources Michigan State University, East Lansing, 
Michigan USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
One of the most significant and enduring ideas associated with the systems initiatives at 
Hawkesbury has been the inter-connections that were made there between systemic acts 
of development in the ‘concrete world’ and the abstract ‘epistemic developments’ of the 
actors who participate in them. Each is seen to be constitutive of the other in a profoundly 
systemic manner, with ‘concrete events’ being both influenced by and an influence on 
‘abstract ideas’. The embrace of critical experiential strategies, which themselves are 
regarded as essentially systemic and reflexive in nature, has been a central feature of the 
pedagogies, research processes, and engagement strategies that have been designed to 
better facilitate this inter-connection.  As calls for more sustainable and equitable forms 
of development gather momentum across the globe, and the citizenry become 
increasingly engaged with issues that are seen to pose significant systemic global risks, 
the need for collective, communicative experiential strategies as systemic discourse, 
becomes evident.  
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PROLOGUE 
At the conclusion of the Crete Symposium within the ISSS conference, a delegate, 
previously unaware of the nature and extent of the Hawkesbury systems initiatives in 
agriculture, social ecology and rural development, asked me a surprising question: From 
all the experiences that I had had in my own twenty year tenure at Hawkesbury, what was 
the one, single most significant lesson that I had learned there that influenced what I had 
been doing in the four years or so since my translocation to Michigan State University in 
the USA?   
  
Somewhat taken aback by such a seemingly reductionistic inquiry at a Systems 
Conference - for never before had I been asked to either prioritize or personalize my 
learning - I replied that I would give the matter some thought and get back to him!  
 
It would not be an easy task: The whole Hawkesbury experience had, after all, been one 
long learning journey characterized by a sustained appreciation of the ever-changing 
braid of ideas and events as our history had unfolded over a quarter of a century - to 
borrow from the evocative metaphor of Vickers (1983).   Furthermore, one of the many 
extraordinary features of the Hawkesbury systemic initiatives has been their emergent 
nature through collective endeavours and the continual sharing of new experiences and 
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developing scholarship, and thus it has always been extremely difficult to separate the ‘I’ 
from the ‘we’.  And then finally there was the matter of my own changed circumstances – 
not just in institutions and indeed nations as well, but in the whole focus of my attention: 
At Hawkesbury I had been concerned primarily with the systemic development of one 
Faculty in the context of its changing role within the systemic development of rural 
Australia, whereas in my present position I focus essentially on the role of an American 
Land Grant University in ‘international development’ within a context of ‘sustainability’.  
 
Not one to shrink from a challenge however, or to explore a familiar scene from an 
unfamiliar perspective, I have been giving the question some very considerable thought.  
What follows here then is a piece in which I try to collect those thoughts into a coherent 
narrative. It is not the paper that I had originally prepared for Crete - for that was still 
written within the genre of a third-party historical commentary about Hawkesbury. In 
contrast, this is a personal narrative that reflects what I think were the most valuable 
lessons for me from our systems initiatives. The story is essentially the identification and 
subsequent exploration of a ‘framework of key ideas’ that while born during my 
Hawkesbury days, has proved to be enduringly useful for my post-Hawkesbury work. 
Perhaps the most important feature here however, is the meta-text that probably best 
illustrates my own systemic development as a learner and how I have come to relate ideas 
and experiences in a systemic, emergent, and critically conscious manner.   In recognition 
of the very many scholars who have influenced my learning I have somewhat exceeded 
the conventional quota of citations.  
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Cutting to the quick with my answer to my questioner:  the most important lesson that I 
learned from my Hawkesbury days is that inclusive development of well-being within any 
complex and messy context (such as agriculture within its natural and cultural 
environments) is a critical function of the intellectual and moral development of all of 
those who are directly involved in, and or affected by, such development endeavors.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
Accepting the notion of development as ‘actions for improvement’, or movement towards 
more mature or advanced states, I have come to appreciate the profound significance of 
approaching the ‘rural problematique’ in three highly inter-dependent dimensions: (i) 
ideas and actions to improve the world about us, (ii) ideas and actions to improve the way 
we generate ideas and actions to improve the world about us, and (iii) ideas and actions to 
improve our intellectual and normative capacities to improve the way we generate ideas 
and actions etc. In other words, I am not content that people in development situations 
merely identify and accommodate relationships between worldviews (or paradigms) and 
developmental transformations in the material world of ‘people and things’. Rather, I 
believe that worldviews themselves need to be consciously developed.  In essence, I 
believe that complex development tasks in the ‘material world’ of people and nature 
demand the development of epistemic states which themselves are complex and which in 
turn allow an appreciation of complexity.  
 
It is this ‘three dimensional’ view of the quest for betterment that I refer to as systemic 
development where the ultimate goal is people learning to be systemic in the manner by 
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which they deal with others as well as nature itself, rather than merely learning how to be 
systems thinkers or how to master systems practices.   Extending a key thesis of Marcia 
Salner (1986), in which she argues that the development of epistemic competence is 
crucial for ‘general systems learning, I submit that the same is even more accurate for the 
development of ‘systemic capabilities’.     
 
I am confident in claiming that the Hawkesbury systems initiatives of the past quarter of 
a century or so have clearly illustrated critical relationships between the conscious 
development of epistemic abilities and their expression in systemic competencies, in a 
context of people working in a complex, dynamic and ‘hybrid’ world in which “all of 
culture and all of nature get churned up again every day” (Latour 1993).  The work has 
also illustrated the vital role that experience plays both in the development of what Freire 
(2003) referred to as ‘critical consciousness’, and as the ‘source of learning’ about which 
John Dewey (1910) was so adamant. Both of these seminal thinkers were concerned with 
connections between experience, learning, and democracy, and it is these same 
connections that lie at the very heart of the contemporary call for development on a 
global scale to embrace freedom as its essential focus, rather than the generation of 
wealth (Sen, 1999).   
 
In these contexts, experience has a much more systemic connotation than merely the use 
of the senses to detect changing physical surroundings or to empirically recognize simple 
problems: Experience “recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and 
material, subject and object, but contains both in an unanalyzed totality” (Dewey, 1910): 
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“Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men (sic) do and suffer, what they 
strive for, love believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in 
which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine – in short, processes of 
experiencing”. Yet again, there is little evidence to suggest that experience is experienced 
or conceptualized in this ‘holistic’ manner within universities, yet actually not knowing 
“what makes up our world of experience, which is the closest world to us, is a crying 
shame..[for]... there are many things to ashamed about in this world, but this ignorance is 
one of the worst” (Maturana and Varela 1987).   
There have been some notable attempts to do something about this situation: Dewey’s 
rich integrated picture of experience for instance, has been adopted by Kolb (1984) who 
gives considerable credit to Dewey as well as to Piaget and Lewin in his own very 
significant work on experience as the source of learning and development and its 
interpretation into a process of experiential learning. Such learning, Kolb argues, is a 
continuous, transactional, developmental and holistic process of adaptation to the world 
that “is not the special province of a single specialized realm of human functioning such 
as cognition or perception …[but]…involves the integrated functioning of the total 
organism – thinking, feeling, perceiving and behaving” (Kolb, 1984).  
 
One of the early insights at Hawkesbury (cf Bawden et al., 1984) was the 
reconceptualization of Kolb’s ‘experiential learning cycle’ as a ‘learning system’ which 
was further enriched with its later interpretation as an embedded ‘system of systems’ 
(Bawden, 1991) as inspired by the three level model of cognitive processing developed 
by Kitchener (1983) and especially her reference to epistemic cognition.    The elegant 
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and persuasive work of Salner (1986) then prompted the further crucial ideas of the 
epistemic development of learning systems, of the relationships between epistemic 
development and the development of systemic competencies, and the role of experiential 
stimuli in promoting both. The essence here is that of paradigmatic challenge where the 
aim is to confront people involved with the process of (rural) development in such a 
manner that it reflects genuine paradigmatic challenge to what Kuhn (1962) referred to as 
those “entire constellations of beliefs , values , techniques and so on shared by members 
of a given community”.    The key to shifts in paradigms – akin, as he argued from his 
context, of scientific revolutions – lay with a growing sense within communities “that an 
existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of 
nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way” (Kuhn, 1962).  From my 
perspective, the essence of the Hawkesbury systems initiatives were all about exploring 
alternative foundations for development paradigms and in the process of critically 
questioning conventions, many of us we were to personally discover the essential truth of 
another of Kuhn’s claims - that scientific (and development) revolutions bring on ‘fierce 
controversies, international name-calling and the dissolution of old friendships’ (Kuhn, 
1972). Even the simple notion of a focus on development itself was taken as 
confrontational, to say nothing of the reaction to our radical adoption of both experiential 
and ‘systems’ principles and practices that we argued as appropriate not only to the 
situation with respect to agriculture in Australia but also to the world beyond: The 
domain in which I focus my current efforts in systemic development.   
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A GLOBAL PROBLEMATIQUE 
Irony, tragedy and paradox alike confront all agriculturists who turn their attention to the 
full complexities of the global problematique within a context of the ‘quest for 
betterment’ that development connotes. And given that agriculture is the essential source 
of food for the planet’s six billion human inhabitants that means everyone on earth is part 
of the ‘area of concern’ for those who would be involved with its development 
internationally. More than simply amplification of national situations, agriculture when 
viewed from a global perspective has emergent properties that reflect the dynamics of the 
very process of globalization itself.   
 
The irony, albeit with little humour to it, lies with the fact that the modernization of 
agriculture has long harboured the seeds of its own demise – if not even ultimate 
destruction. In its present form, agriculture, it is increasingly claimed, is not sustainable 
(Douglass, 1984) from whatever perspective of the panoply of different interpretations 
that the concept of sustainability presents (Davison, 2001).  Modernized agriculture, with 
its twin foci of attention exclusively on technological production and economic 
productivity, has brought with it a litany of unwanted and undesirable socio-cultural and 
bio-physical environmental impacts.  It is a perfect exemplar of the thesis of Ulrich Beck 
(1992) that “in the course of the exponentially growing productive forces in the 
modernization process, hazards and potential threats have been unleashed to an extent 
previously unknown”. In addition to the production of ‘goods’ Beck argues, the process 
of modernization in general, has also resulted in the output of ‘bads’ which is on such a 
scale that we have become a ‘risk society’ where “unknown and unintended 
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consequences come to be a dominant force of history and society” (Beck, 1992).  
Pesticide pollution of the environment, chemical and pathogen contamination of food, 
reduction of biodiversity, deforestation of land and consequential erosion and 
desertification, displacement of people by machines and subsequent rural unemployment, 
the concentration of ownership within the agri-industrial complex, and the sometimes 
ideologically motivated relationships between transnational companies, international 
development agencies, and governments (Perkins, 1997), are all examples of the ‘bads’ 
that are contributing to the risk society on a truly global scale.  All are intrinsically 
complex matters that engage the emotions, the morals and the intellect alike and adding 
further to this complexity is the introduction into agriculture of the bio-technologies that 
involve genetically modified organisms (GMOs) which come with the promise of 
bringing ‘good’ but also with potential for ‘bad’ that is currently unknown – perhaps even 
unknowable for there are, as Krimsky (1995) observes, a host of cultural and symbolic 
dimensions to agricultural biotechnology that introduce further complexities yet to the 
‘good’/’bad’ dichotomy.  
   
While this is all tragic in itself, the even greater tragedy is that for all of their 
developmental endeavours of the past and present, agriculturists must face the reality that 
hunger, starvation, and poverty continue to characterize the lives of billions across the 
globe with the vast majority in the so-called ‘third world. In the so-called ‘developing’ or 
‘less developed nations’ of this world, a significant proportion of the population are still 
rural dwellers and huge numbers are themselves farmers.  Meanwhile the process of 
globalization of what is increasingly referred to as the ‘agri-food system’ continues 
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apace, driven as it is by the forces of capitalism marked by “the development of global 
financial markets, the growth of transnational corporations, and their increasing 
domination over national economies” (Soros, 2002). These forces are not directly 
addressing the tragedies nor are they necessarily helping to alleviate them; indeed under 
many circumstances, they are actually exacerbating them under circumstances where “the 
logic of existing institutions and norms appear unable to accommodate developments in 
agriculture…[where]..both agriculture and policy for agriculture is global in reach” (le 
Heron, 1993).   
  
The paradox is that the paradigm of science-based techno-economic development, which 
some see as an actual ‘betrayal of development’ (Norgaard, 1994), contains to prevail 
even though it is clearly proving to be hopelessly inadequate in the face of the complexity 
of the issues.  Like all modern sciences, agricultural science is guilty of fundamentally 
misconceiving the world, “by fragmenting reality, separating observer from observed, 
portraying the world as a mechanism and dismissing non-objective factors all in the name 
of the domination of nature” (Orr, 1992).   In its persistence with distinctions between 
people and nature, its compartmentalism of scientific disciplines into the social sciences, 
with a marked privilege afforded to economics, and the bio-physical sciences, it is 
essentially denying the intricate inter-connections that clearly exist among people and 
between people and nature.  Poverty and hunger and destitution are all examples of what 
Latour refers to as ‘hybrid’ issues, “imbroglios of science, politics, economy, law, 
religion, technology, fiction” (Latour 1993):  So too are climate change, BSE or mad cow 
disease, HIV-aids, genetically modified organisms, social inequities, the quest for 
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sustainable livelihoods, and indeed the process of globalization itself, which are all 
matters that are central to the responsible development of ‘agri-food systems’.  All of 
these issues have dimensions that demand ethical and aesthetic and spiritual and cultural 
attention in addition to the techno-scientific and economic metrics upon which 
conventional agricultural development has exclusively focused.   
 
Perhaps even more paradoxical - and concurrently ironic and tragic - is that by the 
positivist ‘frameworks of ideas’ that it embraces, the reductionist methodologies that it 
employs, and the objectivist stance that it takes in selecting its ‘areas of concern’, the 
prevailing paradigm of agricultural development, reflecting the nature of classical 
empirical science (Miller, 1983), is unable to recognize its own inadequacies.  And yet, 
where science, technology and neo-liberal economics have been historically seen to 
reduce uncertainties through the rational knowledge that they ‘generate’, “many of the 
uncertainties which face us today have been created by the very growth of human 
knowledge” (Giddens, 1994).  This state of affairs, it is being argued, is being exposed by 
the increasing failure of public sectors to deliver essential services, by a recognition of 
the speciousness of modernism as culture, and by levels of resource depletion and 
environmental degradation “that now endanger many and threaten the hopes of all to 
come” (Norgaard, 1994).  
 
Among the outcomes of the techno-economic stance in general, has been the rise to 
dominance of instrumental rationalist knowledge over others ways of knowing 
(Habermas, 1970) and an elevation of scientists to “experts” who “tacitly and furtively 
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impose prescriptive models of the human and the social upon lay people, and these are 
implicitly found wanting in human terms” (Wynne, 1996).  This in turn has led to a 
“culture of technical control” (Yankelovich, 1991) and of ‘cognitive authoritarianism’ 
where “the rationality of thinking for oneself diminishes as society’s knowledge 
gathering activities expand to the point of requiring a division of cognitive labor into 
autonomous expertises” (Fuller, 1988).  The host of normative issues that clearly lie at 
the heart of this matter are sufficient to support the call for a new moral imperative for 
agriculture (Thompson 1998), and yet by its very nature, ‘normal’ positivistic agricultural 
science has little paradigmatic capacity to deal with ethical matters. Neo-liberal 
economics, on the other hand, has taken the opposite stance, by itself becoming “a social 
and moral philosophy” in which “the existence and operation of a market are valued in 
themselves” and “where the operation of a market or market-like structure is seen as an 
ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action, and substituting for all 
previously existing ethical beliefs” (Treanor, 2004).  Yet, as Sen (1988) argues, there is 
little evidence for the claim that the maximization of self-interest provides the best 
approximation of human behaviour or that it leads necessarily to optimum economic 
conditions.  Accordingly, and drawing significantly on the work of Adam Smith, he 
argues for a radical re-appraisal of the relationships between economics and ethics while 
emphasizing that this would be a mutual exercise in which both disciplines would benefit.   
Clearly there is an urgent and a profound need for changes to occur in conventional 
development thinking and practices alike, for the issues truly are paradigmatic. However, 
as Kuhn (1962) emphasized, paradigmatic shifts do not come easily, and the “transfer of 
allegiance from one paradigm to another is a conversion that cannot be forced”.  Sen  is 
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also appreciative of the difficulties that the exercises that he suggests to bring economics 
and ethics into closer contact with each other would not be particularly easy for they 
involve “deep seated ambiguities and many of the problems are inherently complex” 
(Sen, 1988).  
 
Thus while a shift to systemic development is increasingly indicated, it will not be easy, 
as indeed the Hawkesbury initiatives indicated in spite of the appeal of, and rhetorical 
embrace at least, of the key point of its logic by many people beyond that institution. 
   
 A  LOGIC FOR SYSTEMIC DEVELOPMENT  
The following particular 12-point logic derives from both personal and collective 
scholarship at Hawkesbury and beyond, as reinforced by personal and shared 
experiences. It supports the call for systemic development for ‘agri-food systems’ across 
the globe that are being increasingly globalized through a techno-economic imperative 
that by its current nature some see as actually “betraying progress by leading us into, 
preventing us from seeing, and keeping us from addressing interwoven environmental, 
organizational and cultural problems” (Norgaard, 1994).  
 
Thus: 
1. The responsible development of a multi-functional agriculture within an integrated 
context of the socio-cultural and bio-physical environments in which it is embedded 
is a complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional task. 
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2. Conventional techno-economic approaches to agricultural development have tended 
to extract it from its broader context and to essentially focus on production and 
productivity as the sole expressions of improvement, and, exclusive of civil society, 
rely essentially on the state and on the market as two essential domains of 
development.   
3. These reductionist approaches have come to exemplify the ‘crisis of modernization’ 
where, in spite of the fact that ‘bads’ as well as ‘goods’ are produced on a truly global 
scale, the paradigms themselves are incapable of reflexivity – by the very nature of 
the their epistemic foundations.  
4. The universal need for food and the life-sustaining connections between all people 
and the planet means that agriculture is a major issue of global concern and as such, 
its future developments ought to be matters for public judgment on a truly global 
scale.  
5. Public judgments about ‘better’ agricultures need to embrace ethical, aesthetic, 
cultural, political, ecological, and even spiritual dimensions of development, in 
addition to the economic, technological, social and legal ones to which conventional 
development approaches typically restrict their attention.  
6. Such multi-dimensional views of development draw attention to the need for multi-
dimensional worldviews and epistemic developments that embrace such complexity 
while being themselves complex.    
7. Systemic approaches to development are grounded in the belief that epistemic 
foundations can be both challenged and changed through ‘movements to a more 
 15
advanced states’ which themselves reflect complex evaluative positions involving 
epistemological, ontological and axiological features.  
8.   Experiential stimuli which include social interactions between critically conscious 
people, are essential as triggers for a ‘maturation’ of both the intellectual and moral 
dimensions of epistemic developments that characteristically ‘progress’ from dualistic 
assumptions about the world and how we come to know it, to those that are grounded 
in a contextual relativism that demands continual commitment to experiential 
refinement.  
9. The development of systemic competencies depends essentially on the development 
of epistemic states that both reflect and appreciate the complex evaluative criteria that 
are fundamental to effective and responsible public judgment.  
10. The development of forms of public discourse that explicitly focus on critical 
consciousness within the ‘citizenry’ is a fundamental pre-requisite for the 
development of epistemic awareness which in turn is essential for systemic 
appreciation.   
11. Institutions of education and research, development organizations, organs of 
government, and the media, in needing to assume significant responsibilities for the 
development of such discourses,  need also to develop ways of engaging with civil 
society as well as with each other in a manner quite different from a contemporary 
position which privileges distinctions between ‘the expert’ and the ‘lay-person’.   
12. While the challenges of systemic development are global in their relevance, they need 
attention at all ‘levels’ of social organization and by institutions that operate at all of 
these levels within civil society.   
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Experience suggests that while the logic of the dozen theses above is appealing, they 
prove very difficult to operationalize within conventional educational institutions, at least 
those concerned with the development of agriculture.  
 
AN EXPLICATION OF EPISTEMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Under the present circumstances of the ‘state of the world’ as outlined above, it is 
amazing and also, it might be argued, ethically indefensible that academic communities 
concerned with teaching research, or outreach service in agricultural institutions of higher 
education at least, do not typically adopt development as an explicit focus for either the 
process or the content of any of their conventional missions.  
 
In the context of process alone, with all the research that has been done into intellectual 
and ethical/moral development and in cognitive science, for instance, one would expect 
to find curricula designed specifically to facilitate such theory-informed development. 
There is ample research evidence for instance, to support the thesis that prior knowledge, 
beliefs, skills and experiences have a major influence both on what is learned from 
subsequent experiences and how it is both learned and contextualized (Piaget, 1972), 
(Vygotsky, 1978). In this manner we not only come to know ‘more’ about the nature of 
the world about us, but also to develop different ways of knowing and different 
assumptions about the very nature of knowledge itself.  In essence, our experiences in life 
promote a sequence of intellectual and moral development in each of us, that in essence 
strongly suggests that “knowledge structures and the process through which information 
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is organized and made usable, can progress from a state of simple absolute certainty into 
a complex, evaluative system” (West, 2004).  Yet rarely, if ever, are cognitive theories 
and epistemological concepts such as these used explicitly to inform curricular design:  
Worse yet “[w]e do not in our colleges today make use of any learning principles in a 
considered systematic, professional way. We do not design the college as a learning 
environment” (Simon, 1977): And all of this is in spite of a general espousal of the idea 
within the academy, of higher education and research as the quests for ‘more advanced 
states’ of knowledge and more mature, critical ways of knowing.  
One of the central connotations of the word development is, after all, the movement to a 
more mature (and often more differentiated and complex) state, and that must include the 
state of mind that can recognize that state!   
We can know and we can come to know how we know. We can also come to know about 
knowledge itself and about the limits to knowing, as suggested by Bateson (1972), in his 
explication of different ‘levels of learning’, by Mezirow (1991) with his work on 
transformative adult learning, and by Kitchener (1983) with her tri-level model of 
cognitive processing. But by and large, within the academy, we don’t bother to even 
recognize such distinctions, let alone use them to organise our pedagogies. As a 
consequence there are those who firmly believe that “the core of all of the troubles that 
we face today is our very ignorance of knowing” (Maturana and Varela, 1987) so that 
“our personal life is generally blind to itself”. So too, some suggest, is our institutional 
life, for our institutions both reflect our beliefs and behaviours and norms while in turn 
reinforcing them (Giddens, 1984).  We are characteristically non-reflexive either as 
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individuals or as institutional collectives – as the old adage has it with its clever use of 
words, we do not even know that we have an epistemology, let alone what it is!  
 
The classic longitudinal research of William Perry with undergraduate students at 
Harvard University emphasises the vital importance of self-reflexivity. His work provides 
a signal example of the nature and significance of both intellectual and ethical 
development (Perry, 1970) with a particular emphasis on epistemology. He was to 
essentially conclude from his decade-long study, that “aspects of intellectual and ethical 
development in late adolescence can be described in an orderly way” (Perry, 1970) and 
he developed a complicated schema that identified nine different positions or stages 
through which a majority of the students that he studied, ‘moved developmentally’. 
Perry’s schema reflects three successive epistemological positions - dualism, multiplicity 
and contextual relativism – while emphasising further intellectual development in the 
name of commitment that the students made when faced with the uncertainties of ‘a 
relativistic world’.  
Salner (1986) concluded that Perry’s work related specifically to “structural 
reorganization of epistemic assumptions in the direction of increasing complexity” and 
suggested that this had profound implications for “general systems learning”.  The notion 
of epistemic assumptions she drew from the work of Kitchener who introduced 
‘epistemic cognition’ - where the concern was “reflections of the limits of knowledge, the 
certainty of knowledge and the criteria of knowing” -  as the third level of her three level 
model of cognitive processing (Kitchener, 1983). Perry’s work explicitly emphasized 
vital connections between epistemological and ethical development, which is a theme that 
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both Kohlberg (1964) and Hoffman (1970) also pursued, although with moral 
development as the primary focus in both of their instances. They were both concerned 
with pre-adolescent development – the former from a perspective of how children 
develop a sense of ‘right’, and the latter, a sense of ‘good’. In a recent text, in which he 
first reviews and then extends the work of both Kohlberg and Hoffman, Gibbs (2004) 
explores ontological connections between moral development and reality from which he 
concludes from a perspective of human inter-connectedness, that “acts that wrong and 
harm one individual…ultimately wrong and harm us all”.   
Given the close connection that these scholars have identified between epistemological, 
ontological, and axiological assumptions, it is useful to extend the use of the phrase 
epistemic development to embrace development with respect to all three.       
Other researchers including Belenky et al., (1986), Baxter Magolda (1992) and King and 
Kitchener (1994) have further enriched understandings of epistemic developments and in 
some cases have extended the work to include lifelong epistemic development (Kitchener 
and Fisher, 1990). These studies strongly suggest that there is high degree of 
transferability across different models that all show an essential progression of 
epistemological development ‘from the simple to the complex’ (West, 2004). These 
epistemic changes, which embrace both epistemological and normative dimensions, are 
triggered essentially “through the assimilation of experiential stimuli” (West, 2004).  This 
is an important aspect of Salner’s thesis in arguing that “students must have the 
opportunity to experience (emphasis in the original) the epistemological dilemmas that 
characterize each stage as his or her own personal dilemmas”: and furthermore they must 
be “emotionally able to contend with the temporary stress induced by such dilemmas or 
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mental blocks are unconsciously erected to slow the pace of cognitive change” (Salner, 
1986). 
As she was to further postulate, this matter is of fundamental concern to those who seek 
to develop (and help others to develop) systemic understandings, for these come only in 
association with epistemic consciousness and development from dualism through to 
contextual relativism and commitment. In process terms, the development of epistemic 
competencies appropriate to what she referred to as “general systems learning” is most 
likely to occur “when mild pressure in the environment toward movement is consistently 
present so that the student cannot conveniently escape the kinds of confrontations that 
produce growth” (Salner, 1986).   
 
Two very important features of the Hawkesbury initiatives in this regard were (a) the 
participation of students in ‘real world’ situations from the very commencement of their 
programs, and (b) the major extent to which such participation involved ‘learning groups’ 
and ‘group learning situations’.  Students were thus constantly subjected to ‘experiential 
confrontations’ that involved social learning in situations that were designed deliberately 
to present with situations that, with time, became increasingly complex and messy 
(Bawden and Packham, 1993).  They were in essence, critical learning systems in 
reflexive action, and this image turned out to be a very useful heuristic both for 
curriculum design and for conceptualizing a way of organizing social groups in a manner 
that reinforced for them, the essence of their own systemicity. 
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CRITICAL LEARNING SYSTEMS (CLS)  
A critical learning system is a construct of a group of people who consciously organize 
themselves self-consciously if they were coherent and whole ‘system’ of interconnected 
‘learning sub-systems’ that are collectively self-reflexive while together operating in 
environments with which they are structurally coupled and with which they are 
attempting to co-develop through learning processes (Bawden, 1994).   
 
Ideas, principles, theories, philosophies and methodologies for the organization, structure 
and activities of critical learning systems are drawn from all three ‘schools of systemics’ 
of ‘hard’, ‘soft’ and ‘critical’ (Jackson, 2000). Furthermore, experience with its use as an 
heuristic in a wide diversity of circumstances indicates the nature of a fourth school – or, 
adopting Midgley’s (2000) interpretation of the schools as ‘waves of systems thinking’, a 
fourth wave of systemics.   
 
From the first or ‘hard’ school comes the idea that a group of people can be construed as 
a ‘social system’ of subjective and objective elements, which deliberately and 
consciously develops a sense of its own wholeness and the inter-connectedness of its own 
parts. This social system sees itself, in turn, as a learning subsystem within different 
agroecological systems – farming systems, ‘agri-food systems’, rural systems etc - that 
are themselves embedded in both socio-cultural and bio-physical environmental supra-
systems which are often turbulent in character. Grounded in assumptions of ‘objectivity 
in parenthesis’ (Maturana and Varela, 1987), various ‘hard’ systems methodologies can 
be used to investigate possible ‘interventions’ which would lead to the further 
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development of the ‘real world systems’ while avoiding, or at least minimizing, any 
negative environmental impacts. The essential functions of the system from this 
perspective are based on fairly dualistic/positivistic onto-epistemological assumptions 
with a characteristic focus on instrumental rationality (Habermas, 1971). Importantly this 
‘paradigmatic worldview’ limits the extent to which the critical learning system can be 
self-reflexive. Experiential learning is of the essence, as the learning sub-system seeks to 
transform its ‘experiences’ of the world about it into knowledge necessary to inform 
responsible actions in it and to it.  
 
From the second or ‘soft’ school comes the shift in systemicity from the world to ways of 
inquiring into the world (Checkland, 1981). Rather than an emphasis solely on soft 
systems methodology which is seen to yield learning about the various elements of ideas 
framework, methodology, and area of concern (Checkland, 1985), it is the process of 
critically reflexive learning itself that is privileged. As ‘an inquiring system’ it is seen to 
comprise two fundamental subsystems – experiential and inspirational – through which 
meaning as the basis for meaningful action, is created through the transformation of 
‘experienced reality’ and ‘innate insight’ respectively. This latter focus introduces a 
strong normative dimension that extends beyond ‘rationality’ and draws attention to the 
need to focus also on deontological ethical and aesthetic aspects of development. The 
significance of the crucial connection between transformations for ‘situation 
improvement’ and the worldviews of those involved in the transforming process is further 
extended to embrace, through explicit self-reflexivity, learning in all three dimensions of 
cognitive processing (Kitchener, 1983). This is given a ‘systemic twist’ by presenting 
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epistemic cognition as a context for both meta-cognitive and cognitive activities in what 
can now be considered a ‘holarchy’ of learning levels.  The onto-epistemological 
assumptions of constructivism/contextual relativism are expressed through a focus on 
inter-subjective knowing, discourse, and ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1984) 
which in turn support the argument that “judgment is a genuine way of knowing” 
(Yankelovich, 1991) and an essential foundation for democracy and social justice.  
Debates about ‘desirable and feasible change’ as improvements in existing situations in 
the ‘material world’ must include a focus on the nature and dynamics of epistemic 
development.      
 
From the third or ‘critical school’ comes a further shift in emphasis that reflects a number 
of different aspects of criticality. Drawing on Midgley (2000) the ‘critical turn’ in 
systems thinking calls attention to three foci that include (a) concern for power 
relationships within systemic interventions (cf Jackson, 1982), (Jackson,1991), (b) 
concern for conflicts built into the structure of society (cf Mingers, 1980), and (c) 
concern for the cultivation of emancipatory interests in the development process (cf 
Ulrich, 1983). Within the CLS construct, these are added to the concern for the epistemic 
and meta-cognitive implications for knowing and learning and for public judgment. 
Added also, is concern for the potential consequences of development interventions on 
both cultures and nature alike. Reflexivity thus now becomes multi-dimensionally 
critical. From this critical perspective, development is seen as the quest for a freedom 
from oppression, upon which it also depends (Sen, 1999). Thus to the goal of nurturing 
‘systemic competencies’ of actors in the development process, Sen’s notion of 
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capabilities extends systemic attention to include the provision of opportunities as well. 
This third dimension of criticality places a greatly increased emphasis in critical learning 
systems on axiological aspects of development of both the learning sub-systems 
themselves and of the ‘world’ in which they are attempting to systemically intervene. The 
emancipatory interest of Habermas (1984) is now privileged, and a critical pedagogy is 
indicated through which “the oppressed come to perceive the reality of oppression, not as 
a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can 
transform” (Freire, 2003).  Appreciation of these dimensions of circumstances as context 
for development, come with a maturity that is reflected in the more advanced states of 
intellectual and moral development explicated by Kohlberg (1964) in terms of social 
contracts and individual rights, by Hoffman (1970) in terms of empathy and altruism, and 
by Perry (1970) in terms of personal identity and sense of being “in” one’s life. 
An important systemic perspective on the notion of stages of intellectual and moral 
growth has recently been proposed by West (2004) in which she argues that these stages 
“are hierarchically integrated such that the structure of each successive stage 
differentiates and reorganizes the knowledge constructed at the previous stage”. Under 
these circumstances, it is perhaps more useful to conceptualize them as unfolding ‘waves’ 
rather than as discrete ‘stages’ or ‘phases’. In this context, the decision by Midgley 
(2000) to refer to the three ‘schools’ of systems approaches as ‘waves of systems 
thinking’ suggests a strong correlation with the notion of waves of intellectual and moral 
development thus themselves reflecting a developmental sequence of this nature.  There 
is also an interesting connection with the idea of ‘waves of development’ in agriculture 
that reflect a ‘progression’ of different paradigmatic assumptions (Bawden, 1990): And 
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we need to go further yet in the search for sustainability as an ethos for the way we 
cultivate the earth in ways where the production of ‘goods’ far, far outweighs the 
production of ‘bads’.    
 
CONCLUSION 
In the spirit of continuing development, I would like to conclude this piece with a 
tentative submission that work in systemic development with critical learning systems 
indicates a fourth wave which again finds reinforcement in the idea of epistemic 
development and critical consciousness, although with an interesting twist of introducing 
the notion of the development of ‘modes of consciousness’ themselves!   
 
My own lifelong experiences living and working in rural situations, as well as with my 
own sense of self and the way I have sought to express that through a preference for 
collective involvement and group participation throughout my life, strongly reinforce the 
suggestion by Jackson (2000) that “many people seem to be natural system thinkers”. I 
am not sure that I agree with his second postulate however, that they often “recognize the 
need to have these natural instincts further refined”.  Even when such a recognition is 
made however, I am sure that the three waves of systems thinking and the methodologies 
that they promote necessarily reflect further refinements, for with their continued 
emphasis on rationality, in either instrumental or inter-subjective forms, they can still fail 
to allow the full human expression of ‘being in the world’.  
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I am among those who suggest that many people are more than just systems thinkers but 
are born and/or bred with an innate sense of ‘being systemic beings’ who have an 
inherent and profound sense of their inter-connectedness with others and with the world 
at large: Of experiencing a profound ‘wholeness’ both with ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in 
which they participate with a consciousness that in their participation they are ‘parts 
within a whole’. They reflect an appreciation of the notion that “[w]holeness means that 
all parts belong together, and that means that they partake in each other. Thus from the 
central idea that all is connected, that each is a part of the whole, comes the idea that each 
participates in the whole. Thus participation is an implicit aspect of wholeness” 
(Skowlimowski, 1985).  Perhaps indeed, “a unity with the workings of Nature is 
potentially within each of us” as Penrose (1994) has suggested, and that our insights and 
sensitivities resonate with those workings. And perhaps there is an ‘ecology of mind’ as 
Bateson (1972) suggested with collective thoughts and knowledge that, as Bohm (1994) 
notes, are so automatic to us that we are in large part controlled by them. 
There is a strong sense of the inspirational and intuitive here. Inspirational learning, in 
contrast to experiential learning, asks us not to immerse ourselves in the ‘real external 
world of the concrete’ (the sensual) nor to ‘conceptualize the abstract’ (the conceptual), 
but to ‘disengage’ from ‘reality’ and seek ‘internal insight’ through some form of 
meditation or contemplation (Bawden, 2000). This process will often encompass a 
spirituality that transcends the nihilistic tendencies of the existential that Kohlberg and 
Ryncarz (1990) argue “relies in part upon the self’s particular and somewhat unique life 
experience”.  And this emphasis again on experience, in the richest sense of that word, 
evokes the work of Goethe with a ‘science of conscious participation in nature’ through 
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which he came to see the “wholeness of the phenomenon by consciously experiencing it” 
in a manner where “this experience cannot be reduced to an intellectual construction in 
terms of which the phenomenon is organized” (Bortoft, 1996).   As Bortoft argues, 
Goethe was concerned with the transformation of consciousness itself from “a piecemeal 
way of thought to a simultaneous perception of the whole” (Bortoft, 1996) leading to a 
state in which a relationship could be “experienced as something real in itself” within an 
‘holistic’ context.   
 
To the recent call by Alroe and Kristensen (2002) for a reflexive systemic research 
methodology for agriculture in which the empirical and normative aspects of science are 
integrated as two “key cognitive interests”, I believe that we also need to incorporate a 
meta-physics that captures the essence of Goethe’s holistic science while embracing 
moral philosophies and aesthetic appreciations born of our profound experiences of 
nature and culture alike.  I also believe profoundly in the vital importance of ‘holistic’ 
experience and in the significance of systemic discourse as a ‘methodology’ for the forms 
of social learning that will be critical for responsible public judgments about future 
developments of ‘agri-food systems’ on both global and local scales.  
 
What I have come to conclude is that the innate sense of systemicity that one so often 
encounters within rural communities, and most especially with farmers, is much more 
likely to be characterized by the features just presented as the ‘fourth wave’ than by any 
of its predecessors – vital though they are within their own perspectives.   If I were 
starting all over again on a systemic odyssey with the same level of commitment to 
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scholarship and to praxis and to systemic reform that my Hawkesbury colleagues 
sustained over a quarter of a century, this is where I would now suggest that we started.    
 
EPILOGUE 
On the very eve of this paper going to press, I received an email from an erstwhile 
Hawkesbury colleague which included a reference to a recent report that had been issued 
by an external review team of two eminent scientists of the current agriculture programs 
at the University of Western Sydney. The fourth recommendation struck my particular 
attention:  
Recommendation 4: 
That the use of the experiential learning approach as the over-riding philosophy 
for the teaching of agriculture should cease in favour of more conventional and 
well-proven pedagogical approaches, particularly in relation to the development 
and presentation of underpinning scientific knowledge. 
 
After all the evidence that was illustrated by the logic exposed in this article and by the 
scholarship that underpinned it, by the experiences that we had over a quarter of a 
century, and by the success of our graduates in helping shift the focus from agriculture to 
rural development in Australia, I am left wondering about what is meant by those “well-
proven pedagogical approaches” to be introduced in the stead of experiential pedagogies. 
I also am bemused by the lack of connection being made between experiential knowing 
and “the development and presentation of scientific knowledge” – especially given that 
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the method of empirical science is quintessentially experiential in its character. What 
worldviews, I ask myself, shaped those responses? What level of intellectual and moral 
development do they express? What understanding do they illustrate of critical 
consciousness or the epistemic/systemic nexus?    What appreciation do they show of the 
complexity of the problematique of agricultural modernization or of the irony, tragedy 
and paradox of the conventional paradigm that they seem so keen to re-introduce?  
   
They end this section of their report with their belief that “it is time to formally conclude 
the use of this learning approach, to draw a line under the past and move forward”: With 
this extraordinary sentiment, reflexivity is dealt a mortal blow and the opportunity for 
further lessons to be learned from the Hawkesbury experience with systems initiatives, 
presumably gagged from this point on!    
 
As the old axiom has it, the only thing that humans seem to learn from history is that they 
learn nothing from history.   
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